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Abstract The counterfactual and regularity theories are universal accounts of causa-
tion. I argue that these should be generalized to produce local accounts of causation.
A hallmark of universal accounts of causation is the assumption that apparent varia-
tion in causation between locations must be explained by differences in background
causal conditions, by features of the causal-nexus or causing-complex. The local
account of causation presented here rejects this assumption, allowing for genuine
variation in causation to be explained by differences in location. I argue that local
accounts of causation are plausible, and have pragmatic, empirical and theoretical
advantages over universal accounts.
I then report on the use of presheaves as models of local causation. The use
of presheaves as models of local variation has precedents in algebraic geometry,
category theory and physics; they are here used as models of local causal variation.
The paper presents this idea as stemming from an approach using presheaves as
models of local truth. Finally, I argue that a proper balance between universal and
local causation can be assuaged by moving from presheaves to fully-fledged sheaf
models.
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1 Introduction
An account of causation is universal, I will say, if it is committed in any way to the
following universal assumption (UA),
(UA) If C is a cause of E, then C is a cause of E always and everywhere (at every
space-time location V).
How this assumption should be interpreted of course depends on which account of
causation we employ, since this determines how we define both the general causal
relata types C and E and what it means to be “a cause”. However, both Pearl’s (2009)
modern regularity account and Lewis’ (1973) counterfactual account of causation
are universal. Perhaps more extant accounts of causation are universal in this sense;
perhaps all are.1 I here concentrate on these two.2
Lewis pointed out that Hume defined causality twice, once by regularity and
again by counterfactual dependence.
[W]e may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the
objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or,
in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had
existed. –Hume, The Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, my emphasis
Lewis’s (1973) concern is that regularity theories developed on the basis of Hume’s
first definition remain problematic, so he turns his attention to the second and
the provision of a counterfactual theory of causation. Others, like Pearl (2009),
have remained stalwart regularity theorists. These are different projects, nonetheless
something is shared by both of Hume’s original definitions: they define causes
locally. In each case, ‘a cause’ is defined where an object has an invariant relationship
with subsequent objects; neither says that objects always and everywhere have the
same invariants.3 I begin by arguing that the extant counterfactual and regularity
accounts are universal.
On the counterfactual account, relations of counterfactual dependence between
causes and effects are defined relative to the actual world, and the actual world
includes everything that is spatio-temporally related. Since C is a cause of E iff
there is a chain of counterfactual dependencies starting with C and ending with
E (see § 3.2.1), the counterfactual account can only model causation relative to
a world “always and everywhere”, relative to maximally spatiotemporally related
collections. The most locally fine-grained analysis of causation that can be provided,
on the counterfactual account, defines this-worldly counterfactual truth relative to
other-worldly truth. Moreover, this universality in the counterfactual account is
reflected in the models used4, that refer to a specific world or point of evaluation w
for which no finer structure is provided. Put another way, the counterfactual account
lacks the expressive power to define anything but universal causation.
On the regularity account, C is a cause of E iff events of type C regularly pre-
cede events of type E. According to Baumgartner (2008), “universal regularities
among event types or factors constitute the primary analysans”. Indeed, it is not
unusual to include universality as a criterion for regularities being causal (Anjum
and Mumford 2018). But the problem is not mere analytic preference for universally
quantified event-type level analyses of causation; the commitment of modern reg-
ularity accounts of causation to UA is not mere analytic preference. The problem is
that locations are not events, they do not figure in regularities among event types,
Local Causation 3
so they cannot be causes. Indeed, “C taking place (in a particular location V)” is an
event, and all instances or tokens of event types are presumably spatio-temporally
located like this. But on a regularity interpretation UA cannot be about event tokens;
UA is about universal regularities among event types. Plainly, a token event (in a
particular location V) never regularly precedes another token event, since neither
recurs at all. Once we move from non-recurrent tokens to their types, we are able
to define causes on the regularity account, but token locations are lost in the pro-
cess. The regularity analysis may be in a better position, but not by much. While the
counterfactual account must define a cause relative to an entire world, the regularity
account does not define causes anywhere in particular. The regularity accounts can
express local regularities, but they turn out not to be causal.
What then should we say when UA seems to fail, when causation appears to be
irregular or counterfactually unstable across locations? Modifying Hume’s words,
what account should we employ when one object is followed by another, and all the
objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second in location V,
but not followed by them in another location U? Likewise, what account is available
when, if the first object had not been in V, the second never had existed in V, but if
it had not been in U the second would have existed in U all the same? Hume says
at least what we in fact do in such cases: we explain them away.
[W]hen any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribe not
this any irregularity in nature; but suppose, that some secret cause, in the
particular structure of the parts, have prevented the operation.—Hume, Of
Probability
Today we refer not to a “secret cause” but to a causal-nexus (Anjum and Mumform
2018), causing-complex (Baumgartner 2008) or homogeneous population (Cartwright
1979; Dupré and Cartwright 1988) of background causal conditions B, themselves
variably present at locations, in situations or on occasions, and their variation ex-
plaining the differences in putative causal relationships. That is, confronted with
apparently local causation, advocates of universal accounts can fall back on a uni-
versal explanation (UE) for apparent variation in causation.
(UE) Whenever C is a cause of E in V and it appears that C is not a cause of E in
some distinct U, there always exists some B such that C+B is a cause of E in V
and ¬B at U.
UE is a meta-theoretic principle that is a hallmark of universal accounts of cau-
sation. Put another way, it says that when C is a cause of E somewhere, then it can
only appear to not be a cause of E elsewhere—it cannot actually fail to be a cause
of E elsewhere (UA)—and this is accounted for by postulating some variation in
another interacting cause B of E. Apparent causal variation is explained by causal
insufficiency. Moreover, if B is not yet apparent but merely postulated to explain
apparent variation in causation, then it is a Humean “secret cause.” UE itself is
logically complex: it is universal and conditional, metaphysical, epistemic, ontolog-
ical, and moreover, “locative” or topological. It refers to causes, apparent failures
of causation, the existence of potentially unobserved event types, and to locations.
To my knowledge there is no account of causation or model thereof that is all these
things at once and so no account where UE appears as axiom; there are plenty of
accounts where it enters into theory at the point that irregularities need explaining.
We find approximations of UE in treatments of Humean solutions to irregularity,
or imperfect regularities. For instance,
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[That striking a match is a cause of its catching fire] is not refuted by a struck
match that does not catch fire. Whenever a match is struck, but fails to light,
it may now be argued that – notwithstanding the striking – not all factors
of the corresponding complex sufficient condition for lighting matches have
been instantiated on the respective occasion.—Baumgartner (2008) pg.4
A similar principle is given in Cartwright’s (1979) idea of the correct connection
between laws of association and causal laws. Cartwright offers this in response to
counterexamples against the idea that causes increase the probability of their effects,
saying,
In all cases, the cause fails to increase the probability of its effects for the
same reason: in the situation described the cause is correlated with some
other causal factor which dominates in its effect...A cause must increase the
probability of its effects – but only in situations where such correlations are
absent.—Cartwright (1979) pg.423
The correct connection is then established only in situations where background
correlations are absent, in other words, where situations are causally homogenous
with respect to effects. In relation to UE, we might specify these situations as those
where U and V are causally homogeneous with respect to all causally relevant factors
B. Similarly, Cartwright’s (2004) later view of laws as regularities that are only ever
true ceteris paribus might be interpreted, via UE, as the claim that B occurs in some
such conditions, and that apparent local violations of laws should be explained by
violations of those conditions.
In many cases of scientific explanation, where irregularities might plausibly be
steps on the way to scientific discovery, UE is not necessarily a poor principle to
adopt. To hold to the claim that C causes E, despite the apparent irregularity at
some U, may often lead to fruitful investigations into neglected and relevant causal
conditions B. So UE can appear as an expression of a healthy scientific attitude
toward mounting cases of falsifications of causal claims. However, adopting UE in
all cases unreservedly would be an overly strong buffer against degeneration of
sciences assuming universal accounts of causation—especially when the postulated
causal-nexuses, complexes, or homogeneous populations require a growing number
of secret causes.
For Hume, moreover, UE is a philosophical supposition about causation and not a
natural constraint on causality. Other suppositions are available, so we do not need
to give up on causality to accept apparent irregularities or counterfactual unstabil-
ities as genuine. When a cause fails of producing its usual effect, Hume makes us
aware that philosophers could have ascribed this to irregularities in nature. Nothing
requires us to adopt UE or guarantees that it will lead to fruitful investigations in
all cases of scientific explanation where causation appears to be irregular or coun-
terfactually unstable. Confronted by continued apparent failures of UA, we could
have rejected it instead of adopting UE. The problem is then whether we ever should
reject UA, and what an account and model of causation that explicitly allowed for
local variation in causation should look like.
In distinction from universal accounts of causation, this paper defines and de-
fends the idea that our accounts of causation should be local. An account of causation
is local, I will say, if it is explicitly committed to the following local assumption (LA).
(LA) C is locally a cause of E iff C is a cause of E in some location U and (potentially
at least) C is not a cause of E is some distinct location V.
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This form of LA assumes for simplicity that causation is all-or-nothing. This is
treated in § 3.2.1 using local counterfactual models of causation. If we take causation
to come in degrees, the degree of causal dependence of E on C is local iff there is
some location U where E has (at least potentially) a degree of causal dependence on
C different from what it has in another region V. See § 3.2.2 for regularity based local
causation that can come in degrees. Note also that we can provide a corresponding
allowance for local explanation (LE),
(LE) There are cases where C is a cause of E in V and C is not a cause of E in some
distinct U, and for which there is no B such that C+B is a cause of E in V and ¬B
in U.
Many of our causal claims are local. Examples range from everyday causal
variation, where UE is easily satisfied, to persistent scientific puzzles for which
concrete conditions B satisfying UE are unavailable. The effect of heat on the boiling
of water varies by altitude; the effect of barometric pressure on precipitation varies by
latitude; infectiousness of disease varies in space and time (Delamater et al. 2019);
causes of soil conditions vary topographically (Webster 2000); solar emission of
neutrinos varies seasonally (Glashow and Krauss 1987); some physical “constants”
seem to vary across the cosmos (Webb et al. 2011; Uzan 2011). Universal accounts
of causation can accept these as interesting cases, but must assume the apparent
variation in causation reduces to variation in causal conditions or to error. A local
account of causation involves no such assumption, however. It allows that some
apparent variation in causation is what we might term irreducibly de locus—the
most fundamental explanation we can provide may be differences in location.
The following section justifies this idea by detailing some advantages of having a
local account of causation (§ 2), while the latter sections show how to provide general
models of local causation (§ 3) and what the best such models should look like (§
4). The modelling approach offered in this paper provides a rigorous, flexible and
general way to reap the advantages offered in § 2. A reader that is not yet sceptical,
or who is interested only in the technical details of the model, may safely skip to
§ 3, where semantics for local causal claims is presented prior to supplementary
support for the sheaf theoretic approach in § 4. The presentation of a semantics
for local causation is done step-wise, presenting a non-causal and simplified (0th-
order) account of local-truth and reviewing the requisite mathematical tools (§ 3.1),
as a stage to the following semantics of local causation (§ 3.2). The major ideas are
presented in the language of category theory, since that is the appropriate and most
succinct format for them. Specifically, I argue that sheaves of causal-models are the
appropriate semantic structures for models of local causation (§ 4). This, I argue in
the last section, is because the gluing axiom of sheaves provides an alternative to
universality in accounts of causation.
2 Local Causation: A Plausible Alternative
I said above that the regularity and counterfactual account cannot handle locality
as they stand; I did not say that they could not handle locality with suitable mod-
ification. This paper presents a suitable modification. This section argues that this
approach to local causation costs us little and purchases much.
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Local causation does not cost us much because we can model local causation
without rejecting either the regularity or counterfactual account. This provided we
build additional structure on the models we already use (Lewis 1973; Pearl 2009).
To this end I show how to form categories of these familiar causal models (§ 3.2),
then define a local causal model as a functor which assigns a model from such a
category to each open subset of some topological space, which is conceived as a
collection of organized spatio-temporal locations (§ 3.1). These models then allow
us the freedom to define causes within familiar universal accounts, while building
in enough topological structure to substitute, as necessary, universal causal claims
for local ones.
Before entering into further details of models, I begin with three benefits of a local
account of causation, one “pragmatic”, one “empirical” and another “theoretical”.
These are, briefly, that we can usefully deploy local causation in a number of cases,
that local accounts of causation are empirically adequate and determinate, and that
local accounts of causation are a generalization of universal accounts that permit
greater flexibility in our construction of theories of causation. These are described
in turn below.
The pragmatic reason to allow causation to be local is just that there are many
cases where causation does appear to be local, and that science can sometimes
carry on usefully without universal explanations. Local causation allows us to avoid
postulating the background conditions suggested by UE. We may succeed in finding
a universal background explanation for apparently local cases, but this is sometimes
a Procrustean task that we can helpfully avoid. Every empirical investigation must
get on with some presuppositions, and supposing brute facts of local variation
(“irregularities”) in causation is a perfectly viable way to do normal science. Once
we allow causation to be local, we can afford to assume locality on a case-by-case
basis, as needed. We know well enough that the boiling of water over heat varies
by altitude due to background conditions of atmospheric pressure—UE is easily
satisfied. However, we may never explain cosmological variations in constants by
a difference of causal conditions (Webb et al. 2011; Uzan 2011). But that does not
prevent us from doing cosmology. Indeed, difference of location may sometimes be
the only useful difference to rely upon.
The empirical reason to provide for local causation is familiar: underdetermina-
tion of any account or model of causation that is restricted to locally limited evidence
for its universally general causal claims. Hume and many others conceive of this
broad problem as temporal; as Stanford (2009) notes, empirical underdetermina-
tion is often understood as a limitation on science “by the evidence we happen to
have at present”.5 However, underdetermination is also spatial. Science is limited
by the evidence we happen to have here and now. A proper understanding of the
limits of universally general scientific claims should therefore recognize that un-
derdetermination is spatio-temporal or, more generally, that it is topological. Our
empirical evidence is topologically constrained in ways that regularity and coun-
terfactual accounts are not. We may believe that spatially unrestricted claims are
true, but can only survey the local crows for blackness, only the local swans for
whiteness, and only correlate local barometers with weather patterns. Sometimes
we can do local science by comparing local observations gathered separately. We
may compare ornithological or meteorological data about different geographies,
topographies, climates, etc. Nonetheless, we will continually confront the under-
determination of universal causal theories, since the vast majority of observations
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relevant to non-local causal claims are not collected together in the locations where
we do science.
Put another way, we know that our best access to causation is provided by
epistemically limited procedures, so there could be no set of observations O suffi-
cient to decide on all potential cases of apparently local causation.6 When there is
some apparent difference in causation between locations V and U, a universalist
is committed to the existence of some background and causally relevant condition
B differing between them. Nonetheless, we do not have empirical access to all of
the conditions at any location, but only to small finite sets of observations OV and
OU for each location. Ideally, there would be some observation b differing between
OV and OU and indicative of some causally relevant B. However, potential local
variations in causation are not limited to the small and finite, so we may perpetually
find that OV = OU or that there is no such b ∈ OV \ OU.7 In that case, though both
universal and local accounts of causation may be empirically adequate, only the
local account is empirically determined: what it says is true is determined by, and
only determined by, the phenomena it saves. Local accounts allow us to sacrifice
universal generalization to purchase empirical adequacy and determinacy.8
There are advantages of a local account of causation beyond saving the phenom-
ena. The theoretical reason to allow for local causation is that it provides us with
theories that can do more than the universal ones available. Indeed, local causation
is a generalization of universal causation—the latter is a special case where causation
does not vary according to location. One advantage of this added generality is that it
widens the acceptable responses to instances of irregularities. As Anjum and Mum-
ford (2018 § 5.4) note, if we assume the rule “same cause, same effect” is essential
to our notion of causation, then a difference in effect from what is apparently the
“same cause” has only two acceptable responses: either there is a difference in the
“causal set-up”9, or there was an element of chance involved. Say that both of these
(UE) explanations are de re—they are about the things, events, of cause and effect.10
A local account of causation allows, in addition, explanations de locus. When we
move to modelling local causation, this manifests as allowing that causal claims or
rules are locally true.
If the slogan “same cause, same effect” seems an endorsement of determinism,
then a local account allows determinism to be locally true—it provides for deter-
minism de locus. If the slogan evokes the idea of laws, consider a patchwork of local
laws, such as speed limits—laws de locus. If we analyse the slogan as asserting that
counterfactuals are true of their antecedent and consequent event descriptions at
entire worlds (Lewis 1974 p.560), then a local account allows that counterfactuals
have different truth values at different parts of a world—counterfactual dependence
de locus. If it is taken as a claim that generalizations must be invariant to certain in-
terventions to count as causal (Pearl 2009 p.25, and see Woodward 2005 p.15 and
p.239), then a local account allows that interventions that hold within a location
may differ between locations—invariance de locus.11 Once we allow for variation
de locus in our account of causation, what remains is to provide a way of explicitly
accounting for location in our models of causation. These are not theoretical options
for universal accounts.
In a model theoretic sense, we already treat causation this way. Causal statements
are modelled or interpreted and are true only relative to models or interpretations.
Half of the work is done; we have only to provide a satisfactory way of mapping loca-
tions to models, and we thereby obtain a localization of causal statements. When Bell
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(1986) or Goldblatt (1984) advocate a “local” interpretation of mathematics or “local
truth”, it is in this model theoretic sense: different theorems of classical mathemat-
ics are validated in different model topoi—and this has surely been a theoretically
fruitful sort of locality. In words modified, with homage, from Bell’s (1986) account
of local mathematics: With the relinquishment of the absolute universe of causation,
causal concepts will in general no longer possess absolute meaning, nor causal asser-
tions absolute truth-values, but will instead possess meanings or truth-values only
locally (pg.409). Indeed, far from hampering causal inference, the replacement of
absolute by local causation results in a considerable gain in flexibility of application
of causal ideas (pg.425).
3 Local Semantics
The term ‘sheaf’ stems from work by french mathematicians Jean Leray and Henri
Cartan12 where the concept was put to work at a very different and far more sophis-
ticated purpose than required of it here. It is a translation of the french word faisceau,
itself from the latin fascis, variously translated as “bundle”, “beam”, “ray”, “cluster”
and “sheaf”—all of which are distinct mathematical terms of art. The appropriate
visual analogy is with fields of wheat, where stalks of wheatgrass are bundled to-
gether with spikes facing upwards and sit somewhere on the topography of the
landscape—as depicted in Van Gogh’s Sheaves of Wheat. Further to the analogy, in
a landscape of sheaves blowing in the wind, each section of the field may oscillate
differently, encoding causal information about local gusts. This section supports this
analogy with the formal resources of categorial sheaf-theory.13
This section begins by providing a generic account of local-truth (§ 3.1) then
moves to exposition of local causation (§ 3.2), only in hopes that the latter seems a
shorter leap from the former. There is a rich and diverse history of philosophical and
logical work providing systems to handle locality. Too much to provide due credit.
These systems are variously described as temporal logic (Prior 1968; Prior 1957;
Rescher 1968; Rescher and Urquart 2012), spatial logic, topological logic (Garson
1973), prepositional logic (Garson 1981), locative logic, place logic and logic of
location (Simons 2006). The sheaf theoretic approach used here arguably begins
with Kripke’s (1965) models of intuitionism, where functors are used to organize
possible states of knowledge according to a posetal ordering of time (see Goldblatt
1984, Ch.8.4), the geometric modalities of, e.g., Goldblatt (1984, Ch.14), and with the
“local” accounts to truth in Bell (1986).
Within this diversity of presentations there is a corresponding diversity of syn-
taxes, metaphysical justifications and axiomatic systems. I will not here be concerned
with which of these is correct—which metaphysics of tense or space we should
adopt, which axioms about location or tense we should accept or which syntax to
use—but instead focus on semantics only.14 The aim of this article is not to decide
on an approach to location relative truth-values but to rely on such an approach to
discuss location relative causation. To that end, only the most general features of a
logic of location will be required.
I approach this in the language of category theory, since that is the appropriate
setting for the analysis of (pre)sheaves. J. W. Gray (1979) attributes the following
suggestive phrase to M. Auslander, “sheaf theory is the subject in which you do
topology horizontally and algebra vertically”, with the afterthought that perhaps
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logic would be done in the third dimension. Presheaves are often represented as
a horizontal plane depicting a topological space with algebraic structures such as
rings or groups sitting above points or opens sets. My suggestion is that, while we
continue to do topology horizontally, we use sheaf theory as a guide to doing causal
modelling vertically. That is, to conceive of local causal models as presheaves, where
causal models take the place of algebras.
3.1 A Local Account of Truth
In any local account of truth there are evidently three things that must somehow be
associated semantically: (1) locations, (2) statements and (3) truth-values. Simons
(2006) presents a general framework for logic of location that I will take as the point of
departure here.15 Suppose that we have some collection L of locations (not otherwise
specified) and a collection S of statements. Simons (2006) then defines a “truth-value
distribution of S over L” to be a function D : L×S→ {0, 1}. The intuitiveness of this
presentation is laudable: D assigns truth-values to pairs of a location and statement.
I will argue for an essentially similar approach below. Though, to avoid confusion
later on, let us first make the following substitutions. Instead of a collections of
statements S consider an (arbitrary, 0th-order) language L, and instead of a set of
locations L let us consider a topological space τ. WhereΩ = {0, 1} is the set of truth-
values, Simons’s (2006) proposal can then be re-written as a function D : τ×L → Ω,
i.e., as a function from pairs of open-sets in τ and sentences of L to truth-values.
By considering the domain of these semantic objects to be a product of location
and sentence, this approach obscures something fundamental about local-truth: that
it is a functor. Instead, I suggest we consider functions D̂ : τ → ΩL, assigning to
each open-set in τ some function v : L → Ω, i.e., assigningL-models to τ-locations.
This is a change of perspective, not of fundamental concept. First, notice that ΩL
is a power object, and is essentially a collection of truth-value functions (typically
denoted V). This implies that there is an isomorphism between D̂ and D. That is,
there is an assignment of a unique D̂ to each D—where D̂ is called the transpose or
currying of D. According to the commuting diagram below: D = eval ◦ (D̂ × IdL).
τ τ × L
ΩL ΩL × L Ω
D̂ D̂×IdL D
eval
Fig. 1 Commuting diagram for ΩL as a power object.
The function eval simply applies the truth-value function in ΩL to a specific
sentence in L, giving a truth-value. This is logic as usual,16 except occurring at a
specific open-set in τ. I suggest using the transpose D̂ of truth-value distributions
D since, in this context, we are primarily concerned with the relationship between
locations and models (truth-value functions), and not with the particular evaluations
of sentences at locations. Moreover, this approach makes the definition of local-truth
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straightforward.17 Where V is a collection ofL-models, τ a topology, andF : τ→ V
a function, we may define the truth of (an L-sentence) α at a location U ∈ τ.
F  α@U ⇐⇒ F (U)(α) = 1
I will now advocate a categorial approach to local-truth before turning to local
causation in the following section (§ 3.2). This first requires a category to serve
as a collection of models. Consider the collection of 0th-order L-models, i.e., the
collection of truth-value functions V defined onL. There is a collection of morphisms
defined on V. These we might call truth-value re-assignments and are functions
f : vi → v j transforming one truth-value assignment vi into another v j. These
functions must at most re-assign truth values to atomics while otherwise preserving
recursion in the definitions of truth for compounds. Together, these collections form
a categoryV. We also need a categorial equivalent of a topology. Given a topological
space 〈X, τ〉, there is a standard categorialization, TX having as objects the collection
of open-sets τ and an arrow f : V → U whenever V ⊆ U.
A local (L-)model can now be succinctly defined. F is a local (L-)model iff F is
a V-valued presheaf over TX, i.e., F is a functor,
F : T opX → V
Unpacking this definition into some of the terminology of sheaf theory,F is a functor
such that,
1. For each open-set object U of TX there corresponds an (ordinary model) object
F (U) of V, where F (U) is called the sections of F over U. Typically, F (U) is a set
of some kind, hence the plural ‘sections’, and for our purposes it will suffice to
consider it as a set of ordered pairs 〈`, ω〉 such that ` ∈ L and ω ∈ Ω.
2. For each inclusion f : V → U there corresponds a truth-value re-assignment
F ( f ) : F (U) → F (V). These are typically called restriction morphisms, i.e., the
restriction of U to V and will here be denoted ρV,U : F (U) → F (V). In essence,
whenever V ⊆ U, we are able to restrict or further localize our model F (U)
to a model F (V) for the contained location V. These satisfy two constraints in
addition: (1) ρU,U = IdF (U) and (2) ρW,V ◦ ρV,U = ρW,U whenever W ⊆ V ⊆ U.
We should not now be concerned whether this is the correct or best model of local
truth, but just that it is sufficiently general. In particular, it is a generalization of non-
local, absolute truth. A “local” model F can nonetheless model a case in which truth
is non-local when it is a constant pre-sheaf. That is, we obtain a non-local model
from a local one by setting F (Ui) = v and ρUi ,U j = Idv for all Ui,U j ∈ τ, so that F is
essentially just the truth-value function v. Similarly, we can model a case where the
truth is “different everywhere” by a pre-sheaf where F (Ui) = F (U j) =⇒ Ui = U j.
Before moving to an account of local causation, we should cover the conditions
that a pre-sheaf must satisfy to be a sheaf. Firstly, because this will go easier with-
out the additional complexities of modelling causation, and secondly because it is
sheaves, I will argue, that best capture local causation (§ 4). Consider an example
motivating sheaves in the context of local-truth.
There are 25 bridges in the city of Cambridge, 10 in the Middle River district
and 1 on the grounds of Clare College. To be a pre-sheaf, a local model of claims
about the number of bridges by location must specify these numbers, but it must
also tell us how, when in Cambridge, we are to properly restrict our claims to both
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the Middle River and to Clare College. Moreover, it should give us the same answer
whether we restrict ourselves to Clare College directly, or first via Middle River.
This is intuitive enough, indeed it borders on what we would trivially expect from
considering smaller and smaller sections of a map. But consider that it does not
specify what should obtain when we compare maps along overlapping edges. It
is possible to cover Cambridge by a collection of maps, none of which themselves
have 25 bridges. Indeed, pre-sheaves do not in general guarantee that we can come
to any conclusions by integrating or gluing together compatible information about
given locations. Sheaves, however, do.
To define a sheaf we also require the notion of an open cover, which is an (indexed)
family of sets {Ui} such that U ⊆
⋃
i∈I Ui. That is, a set is a subset of the union of an
open cover of it. A sheaf is then a presheaf F satisfying two additional constraints
relating sections to open coverings in 〈X, τ〉. These conditions are called (1) locality
and (2) gluing.
1. Locality If s, t ∈ F (U) are such that ρUi ,U(s) = ρUi ,U(t) for all Ui covering U,
then s = t. In other words, sections are uniquely determined “locally”, by their
restrictions.
2. Gluing If ρUi∩U j ,Ui (si) = ρUi∩U j ,U j (s j) for all i, j, then there exists a (unique) s ∈
F (U) such that ρUi ,U(s) = si for all i. When restriction of sections “agree” or
are “compatible” on intersections of underlying locations we are assured the
existence of a more global section obtained by concatenating or gluing these
together.
Presentations of the definition of sheaves are quite diverse18. We can thankfully
here concentrate on them in this simplified and limited context. Recall that a section
s ∈ F (U) is a pair s = 〈`s, ωs〉 of a sentence `s ∈ L and a truth-value ωs ∈ Ω. Locality
then says just that, for distinct pairs s , t there is some sublocation where they are
re-evaluated differently. That is, moving from a pre-sheaf to a sheaf comes with
the additional constraint that distinct truth-value assignments must be distinctly
re-evaluated at some sublocation.
Locality tells us something about truth-evaluations moving more locally; gluing
tells us about what happens as we move to a more global evaluation. Consider the
simplest case, where we have some U and V, and imagine that U ∩ V , ∅. Gluing
says that, if we find compatible evaluations, i.e., a sentence that is re-assigned the
same truth-value in U ∩ V whether this is done from U or from V, then there is an
assignment of that sentence in U∪V which is, from there, re-evaluated to what it is
in U. For an example, consider the weather being evaluated in the United Kingdom
and in Ireland (which intersect in Northern Ireland and are together the British Isles).
Being a pre-sheaf, we imagine that our local-model at least assigns some model of
the weather to each location and some way of restricting that model to sublocations.
Consider a particular statement about the weather, such as ` = “It rains most of
the year.”. If our local model is a sheaf, we are guaranteed the following: if our re-
evaluation of ` to Northern Ireland is the same from Ireland as it is from the United
Kingdom, then there is some way of restricting our evaluation of ` in the British Isles
to precisely what it is in Ireland. Compatible re-evaluations guarantee more-global
evaluations. In § 4 I argue that gluing, more than universalization, appropriately
captures our best scientific account of causation.
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3.2 A Local Account of Causation
But when different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are
to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind
in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our consideration, when
we determine the probability of the event... we must not overlook the other
effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority.
—Hume, Of Probability, 56
In his writing on probability, we find a somewhat different Hume. Instead of
invariant causal relationships “which are entirely uniform and constant in produc-
ing a particular effect” [ibid], Hume considers those “more irregular and uncertain”
cases—the purgative effect of rhubarb, the soporific effect of opium—and the con-
sequent problem of accounting for observed irregularities in causation (see Gower
(1991) and references therein). We are also given an example of local variation of
probabilities,
It is more probable, in almost every country of Europe, that there will be
frost sometime in January, than that the weather will continue open through
out that whole month; though this probability varies according to climate,
and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms.—Hume, Of
Probability, 56
This variation is, however, not Hume’s primary target, since he continues: “[I]t
seems evident, that, when transferring the past to the future... we transfer all the
different events, in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past” [ibid, my
emphasis]. Were Hume addressing climatologists, we can imagine that he would
have placed more importance on what is different about this case, over and above
irregularity and uncertainty. No amount of transferring the proportions of past
events will suffice to correctly assess that probability—of observing frost given that
it is January—if those past events were observed in different climates. An untravelled
Englishman is ill equipped to be a Norwegian meteorologist.19
Rectifying this is straightforward: we must either restrict our assessment of
the transfer of past proportions of events to a given location, or refine Hume’s
claim about transferring the past to the future to say “...in the past and at a given
location”—we must do “science locally” or do “local science”, respectively. These
are similar but not the same. They entail different things about what is demanded
of scientists and modellers of causation. If we only ever did science locally, then the
problems that emerge from attempting to transfer our estimations about causation
to other locations could be set aside and we could do science as usual. Doing “local
science” instead entails that we account for location in the procedures of science.
This immediately raises a question for modellers: how should we account for location
when modelling causation?20
In this section I present the idea that introducing a functor based localization
approach into causal modelling—analogous to that involved in modelling local-
truth—is one way to go about accounting for location when modelling causation.
Unlike the simplified case of propositional modelsΩL, there is a plurality of distinct
types of models of causation used in science. While there is justifiable disagreement
about this picture depending on variant definitions, the following informal diagram
(Figure.2) roughly describes the relationship between some common models of
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causation. Though not easily placed on the diagram, a further example of causal
modelling using category theory deploys symmetric monoidal categories in models
of quantum phenomena (Fong 2013; Coecke and Lal 2013).
Thankfully, there are many pursuits in science21 that have taken steps in the di-
rection of localization of causes. Localization is used in spatial epidemiology (Elliott
et al. 2000) and phylogeography (Soltis et al. 2006), where causal relationships are lo-
calized on the basis of disease contributing factors and patterns of evolution, respec-
tively. Within physics, a program of research which uses partially ordered causal sets
(Bombelli et al. 1987; Bombelli 1983; Sorkin 1990; Sorkin 2005) has been integrated
with a localization approach based on functors (Raptis 2000; Raptis 2001; Mallios and
Raptis 2001). The use of (pre)sheaves of probability distributions (Abramsky and
Brandenberger 2011) has been advanced as models of ‘non-locality’ (Bell J. S. 1964)
and contextuality (Kochen and Specker 1975) of quantum measurements. Though
without sheaf-theoretic framing, Cavalcanti’s (2018) approach to non-locality and
contextuality using Pearl’s causal models, is yet another case where localization of
causes has been fruitfully applied in physical science. In some of these physical
cases, the mathematical models used are fully-fledged sheaves. Though each are em-
broiled in the analysis of the particulars of their target systems, these programmes
can be given a local character when categories of the corresponding causal models
are used as values for presheaves.
Probability Distributions Posets Pos
Directed Acyclic Graphs Dag
Directed Graphs Dgr






Fig. 2 Informal diagram of the relationships between a selection of structures used to represent
and model causation. On the far left, scientists represent data as either probability distributions or
networks. The formal mathematical structures arising from these modelling tools occupy the middle
block. Posets and DAGs are the formal tools most often associated with models of probability
distributions. Posets are the objects of the category Pos, which is left adjoint to the category Dag
of directed acyclic graphs. Corresponding to the fact that DAGs are a subtype of directed graphs,
which are in turn a subtype of directed multi-graphs, the category Dag is a subcategory of the
category Dgr of directed graphs, itself a subcategory of the category Quiv of quivers (which is a
topos).
We do not lack material for local causal modelling; we have a disunified abun-
dance. Given this diversity, we should begin with a very general idea about how
causation can be localized, then impose constraints or specifications on this method
depending on our particular view of causation and locations. As Pearl says of gen-
eral theories of causation,
In addition to embracing all questions judged to have causal character, a
general theory must also subsume any other theory or method that scientists
have found useful in exploring the various aspects of causation. In other
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words, any alternative theory needs to evolve as a special case of the “gen-
eral theory” when restrictions are imposed on either the model, the type of
assumptions admitted, or the language in which those assumptions are cast.
—Pearl (2010)
For questions with a local causal character, § 3.1 provides such a general theory.
A local causal model is going to be, in general, an S-valued presheaf over some
topological category TX, where S is a category the objects of which are “causal
models” and the morphisms of which are appropriate model-structure preserving
maps. What remains is to specify the category S, and the appropriate morphisms,
for causal claims cast in the languages of counterfactuals and regularities.
3.2.1 Local Counterfactuals
I use the counterfactual account of causation of Lewis (1973) for simplicity and
because the advantages and shortcomings of this account are well known (Salmon
1994; Woodward 2005; Menzies and Beebee 2001; Collins et al. 2004). There seems
to be an emerging consensus that the counterfactual account of causation is not
the most useful for scientists. Nonetheless, as Lewis (1973) points out, “we do
know that causation has something or other to do with counterfactuals.” To define
counterfactual dependence A  B between two sentences A and B we require
something like a Kripke-modelM = 〈F,w〉, where F = 〈W,R〉 is like a Kripke-frame
and W is a set of “worlds” (or “points”) as usual, except that the accessibility relation
R ⊆W ×W ×W is trinary and interpreted as a nearness or similarity relation. Lastly
we assign an entailment relation to each world w 7→w. Lets call these Lewis-models.
Next we define the entailment of counterfactual dependence by the model as,
M w A B ⇐⇒ (∀w′ )(M w′ A ∧ ¬B =⇒ (∃w′′ )M  A ∧ B & R(w,w′′,w′))
That is, B is counterfactually dependent on A iff for every world that makes A true
and B false, there is a closer (more similar but not identical) world that makes both
true—or, it takes more deviation from the world w to make A not imply B than it
does to make A imply B. The next step is to “extend causal dependence to a transitive
relation in the usual way” (Lewis 1973, pg.563). Given a language L for whichM is
a model, where Ci...Cn ∈ L, define,
M w A{ B ⇐⇒ (∃Ci ...Cn ) A Ci & Ci  Ci+1...Cn  B
Intuitively, we can read A{ B as “A is a cause of B”. Granted a languageL extended
by the rule,
If α, β are sentences, then α{ β is a sentence.
The Lewis-model can then be treated as a semantic functionM : L → Ω, as above
(§ 3.1).
Notice that A A follows trivially from the consistency ofM: since there can
be no world w′ whereM w′ A ∧ ¬A. Secondly, counterfactual-dependence implies
causation: A  B =⇒ A { B, taking n = 1 and C1 = B. Evidently, if M is an
L-model, the poset (L,) imposed byM gives rise to a category with elements of
L as objects and an arrow f : α→ β iff α β. But for the end of localizing causation
it is not enough to recognize that Lewis models give rise to a posetal category. This
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categorial model of causation is still “universal” or “global”; it makes no mention of,
nor dependency on location. Moreover, presheaves into this category would assign
members of L to open sets, localizing only single causal claims, not causation.
To define a local counterfactual model we require a collection of Lewis-models
and maps between these. We have fairly strong reasons regarding what exactly these
maps should be. Firstly, the singleton world appearing in the model is the “actual”
world, and the actual world should not vary from place to place. We should not be
able to leave actuality by going somewhere. Secondly, a Kripke-frame is the model
theoretic equivalent of what, according to Lewis (1986), we might call one particular
way that the totality of all worlds is. If we assign exactly the same frame and actual
world to each place, then there is no room for causation to vary either. Nonetheless,
if we assign entirely different frames to different places within the same model,
then we have metaphysically committed ourselves to places where the totality of all
things there is different from what it is here. We cannot move the heavens, the best
we can do is affect a shift in perspective on the constellations of possible worlds;
we can rescue some metaphysical intuitiveness by stipulating that between frames
there should at least be an invariance of the primitive relations of similarity among
worlds. That is, that our maps between Lewis-models should be actuality preserving
and frame relation preserving maps. Causation can then still vary between a model
and those it maps to, simply because the assignment of an entailment to worlds
still differs, while nonetheless actuality and the overall background structure of the
“sum totality of everything” is preserved.
Happily, these sorts of maps are also perfectly well defined mathematically,
once we consider what sort of set Lewis-models are. A Lewis-model is essentially
a (trinary) pointed-related set, the morphisms of which form a category (Rydeheard
and Burstall 1988; Adámek et al. 2004). A trinary pointed related set is an object
〈A,RA ⊆ A×A×A, ∗a ∈ A〉where A is a set, R a 3-relation on A and ∗a some element
of A selected as the point. If 〈B,RB, ∗b〉 is another such set, and f : A → B is a
set-function, then f is a morphism of pointed related sets iff,
1. f (∗a) = ∗b
2. RA(x, y, z) =⇒ RB( f (x), f (y), f (z))
Likewise, a morphism f : M1 → M2 of Lewis-models M1 = 〈F1,w1〉 where F1 =
〈W1,R1〉 (andM2 likewise), is a function that is (1) actuality preserving: f (w1) = w2 and
(2) Kripke-relation preserving: R1(w,w′,w′′) =⇒ R2( f (w), f (w′), f (w′′)). Moreover, this
sort of mapping allows that M w α β while f (M) 1 f (w) α β, since there is
no stipulation that maps preserve assigned entailment relations, that wi =  f (wi),
for arbitrary wi. Call these ‘Lewis re-modellings’, by analogy with the sense of re-
assignments involved in local-truth. For our purposes, this defines the category
Lew having objects the Lewis-models and morphisms the actuality and relation
preserving maps.
A local causal model can now be defined. F is a local causal model iff F is a
Lew-valued presheaf over TX.
F : T opX → Lew
To each open set U,F assigns some Lewis-modelF (U) =MU. This straightforwardly
gives rise to a definition of local-truth of causal sentences, i.e.,
F  (α{ β)@U ⇐⇒ F (U) ∗F (U) α{ β (1)
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Before turning to regularity analysis and justifying a sheaf theoretic model for
causation, I will simply spell out some consequences of this approach.
Treating the pre-sheafF as a local causal model involves looking at Lewis-models
MU as a collection of sections F (U) over U. The question naturally arises what then
should be considered an individual section of F (U). Categorially, it is sufficient to
say that an element is a function x : 1 → F (U) in Lew from the terminal object 1.
But the abstraction of this definition requires some unpacking. Firstly, the terminal
object in Lew is going to be any singleton of the form 1 = 〈{∗w,w′}, {〈∗w, ∗w,w′〉}, ∗w〉
since there is exactly one arrow ! : 〈A,RA, ∗a〉 → 1 in Lew from any other Lewis-
model 〈A,RA, ∗a〉. This is defined by (1) !(∗a) = ∗w and (2) ∀a,∗a !(a) = w′. Notice that 1
cannot be an object of the form 〈{0}, {〈0, 0, 0〉}, 0〉, as it would be in the plain category
of trinary pointed relations, since 〈0, 0, 0〉 is not a meaningful comparative similarity
relation.
In other words, a section s ∈ F (U), an “element” of a Lewis-model, is another
Lewis-model s = 〈{∗w,w′}, {〈∗w, ∗w,w′〉}, ∗w〉 with a pair of worlds from the frame of
the first, one actual and some other world, which are related in the only meaningful
way (such that the actual world is more closely related to itself than it is to the
other world). Assessing the truth of a non-trivial counterfactual sentence α β
relative to an element s ∈ F (U) is then just a matter of checking whether α ∧ β
is true at the “other world”, i.e. whether of s w′ α ∧ β. Put another way, while a
Lewis-model typically considers a collection of alternative possibilities, the elements
of a Lewis-model consider only a single alternative to actuality.
We can also give some sense to the restriction morphisms of F. Being a pre-sheaf,
F not only provides a causal model for each location, it also provides a way of
restricting our causal model—a way of re-modelling causation—at sub-locations.
Graphically, we can picture how this must work for some worlds ∗,w,w′ of F (U)









R( f (∗), f (w), f (w′))
ρV,U
Fig. 3 Depiction of restriction morphisms between Lewis-models. Note actuality- and relation-
preservation.
ρV,U[F (U)] differ in what is counterfactually true. For example, we might restrict
ourselves to a location where, from there, the closest α-world is no longer also a
β-world.
To conclude the presentation of the case for local counterfactuals I will now show
how to define such a presheaf by topologizing a “global” Lewis-model. Granted
some modelM = 〈W,R,w〉, since W is a set of some kind, we can consider a topology
τ on W and a corresponding topological space Wτ = 〈W, τ〉. The purpose of doing
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this is firstly to provide some concrete TW , but also to generate a family of Lewis-
models, one for each Ui ∈ τ. To the latter end we require a “marking” function
∗ : τ→W assigning some actual world to each U ∈ τ, satisfying,
1. ∗(U) ∈ U for U , ∅
2. ∗(W) = w
3. ∗(∅) = w (further trivial cases involving empty or singleton sets are hereafter
ignored)
We can then form the family of Lewis-models,
Mi |Mi = 〈Ui ∈ τ,R|Ui , ∗(Ui)〉 (2)
and the collection of morphisms of Lewis-models as above. Together these form
a category LewM of Lewis-submodels of M, providing for an evident pre-sheaf
F : T opW → LewM where F (U) = MU and restriction maps are morphisms of cor-
responding Lewis-models. Finally, F is a sheaf just when it is a sheaf of pointed
related sets, provided the relation is meaningfully one of similarity.
3.2.2 Local Regularities
Other accounts of causation require some other interpretations of restrictions and
decisions about a suitable notion of invariance. Returning to Hume’s example of ge-
ographic variation, we may instead want restrictions to manifest as maps between
conditional probability distributions, and for invariance to take the form of con-
straints on reconditionalizing averaged over the sum of contained locations. E.g.,
the probabilities that it will frost in January given one is in some region of England
should average, over all subregions, to be the probability that it will frost in Eng-
land overall. Today, however, we can do a bit better than Hume’s native regularity
analysis.
Despite the problems facing both, Hume’s regularity analysis arguably survives
in its most complete form today in the causal graph analysis of, e.g., Pearl (2009).
Free somewhat from the metaphysical convolutions of Lewis-models, the definition
and exposition of local causal models stems quite well from Pearl’s (2009, pg.202)
structural model semantics.22 A comprehensive treatment of local regularities is not
possible here (see Cavalcanti 2018; Pfeiffer et al. 2008), but the essentials of catego-
rializing Pearl’s approach can be covered briefly.
We can begin with the definition of a structural causal model, as a triple M =
〈B,E,F〉where,23
1. B = {bi | i ∈ I} is a set of “background”, “predetermined” or “exogenous”
variables, intuitively conceived as things constant and outside of the model.
2. E = {ei | i ∈ I} is a set of “endogenous” variables that are determined by things
inside the model, i.e., by B ∪ E.
3. F = { fi | fi : B ∪ E → ei is a partial function} such that F : B → E. Overall F is a
mapping from background to endogenous variables.
This allows us to define a category Cau having structural causal models as objects
and morphisms defined components-wise on these as triples. That is, functions g :
B1 → B2 and h : E1 → E2 define morphisms f : M1 →M2 of structural causal models
provided the following diagram commutes. Pearl suggests thinking of individual
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fi ∈ F as specific mechanisms, and in like manner we might think of morphisms of
structural causal models as mechanism-order preserving maps. Moreover, since each
such model gives rise to a directed graph G(M), there is an evident mapping of this







h ◦ F1 = F2 ◦ g
A local structural causal model is then a functor,
F : T opX → Cau
To the end of modelling local causation, it sometimes makes sense to restrict our
attention to the morphisms corresponding to “local actions” or “submodels” (see
Pearl 2000, § 7.1.2). Essentially, these are just morphisms that are identities on B and
E, but which allow certain fi ∈ F to become constant, effectively backgrounding them
or setting them to a value specifying a local condition or an hypothetical change,
including, in Pearl’s terminology, those “implied by counterfactual antecedents”
(pg.204). Were the aim to model local regularities, under the assumption that these
arise from local actions or local changes in mechanism, then the appropriate models
are pre-sheavesF : T opX → CauM having sections in the categoryCauM of sub-models
of some given “global” structural causal model M.
4 Conclusion: Why We Should Use Sheaves
Thus far the aim has been to build up to the machinery necessary to model causation
locally—the minimum required to give meaning to claims that causation here is
different from causation there. Care has been taken not to place any constraints on the
account other than those demanded of the background mathematics—the conditions
on being a category, functor, mapping between pointed related sets or map of
digraphs. In conclusion, to save something of the intuition that causation involves
more than merely local relationships, that causation involves “global” relationships,
I suggest that the additional constraints we should put on local causation are those
required to specify pre-sheaf models as fully-fledged sheaves.24 Put another way, if
we can provide some local model of counterfactuals or regularities as a presheaf F
and we are aiming for a more global model of causation, thenF should be a sheaf.25
Universal account of causation suffer persistent problems (§ 1-2), but to reject the
universality of causation entirely seems to imply a world without causes or laws,
since both seem to depend integrally on universal notions (Carroll 2016; Anjum and
Mumford 2018). Indeed, a world where all causal goings-on are irregular, accidental,
or monads, is philosophically dissatisfying. Faced with this dilemma, as Lewis (1973)
says regarding the problems facing regularity analyses, “it is time to give up and
try something else”.
My response is that the dilemma is a false one. We are not in the theoretical
position of being forced to entirely accept or reject what is held dear about univer-
sal accounts of causation, since understanding causation as sheaf-like provides a
middle way. Our dilemma can be reframed as a problem of keeping track of lo-
cal causal variation and amalgamating compatible information when possible; our
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metaphysics then need only hold that there is a consistent way to do so. Between
this Scylla and Charybdis, the view of causation as sheaf-like (and that therefore our
models of causation should be sheaves) allows one to navigate more freely between
these extremes.
Between the horns of causal universality (UA) and mere locality (LA), sheaves
offer principles of intermediate strength, since they build in assumptions about
how compatible information can be glued or concatenated together (§ 3.1). The
locality axiom is vital to ensuring that sections of sheaves are uniquely determined
locally and that the concatenation of compatible sections is unique. The gluing axiom
of sheaves offers something sui generis to handle the problems facing universal
accounts of causation.26 This is really a consequence of what sheaves offer to local
truth, but extended up to causal truths. When granted ways of restricting our claims,
further localizing them, and comparing these restrictions with intersecting locations,
gluing allows us to come to more global claims by piecing together our local sections.
Viewing causation as sheaf-like allows us to accept that under the best conditions
(agreement of compatible sections) we can further globalize or universalize our
causal claims, without assuming any claims are universal to begin with. That is,
we can use gluability instead of universalizability as a criterion of genuine causal
relationships.
A sheaf-like account of causation brings our ontology more in line with our
science: both being epistemology en plein air. Doing ontology in the field, we are
better off gluing compatible causal information together than assuming universality;
better off sketching the local landscape than supposing what is indemonstrable in
principle. Returning to the visual analogy (at the beginning of § 3), by looking at
specific sections of the sheaves of wheat in a field we may be unable to determine the
overall direction of the wind. Indeed, there may be no consistent direction spanning
the entire landscape. Nonetheless, we should be able to come to a more circumspect
view of the weather, causation writ large, by examining sections covering greater
and greater portions of the topography.
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Notes
1A moderate position (suggested to me by Jacob Stegenga), is that all extant accounts of causation
can be reasonably presented in a way that is committed to UA.
2Of course, there are other accounts of causation, such as Woodward’s (2005) interventionist
account, and correspondingly other models of causation (see Figure 2, § 3.2). I confine my discussion
to this broad split between counterfactual and regularity accounts for tractability. On the other
hand, the counterfactual and regularity accounts are not wholly distinct—both Lewis and Pearl
occasionally deploy both regularity and counterfactual notions (e.g. Pearl 2009 p.389). Moreover,
Woodward’s (2005) account of necessary and sufficient conditions for causal relationships is both
evidenced by regularities and defined in counterfactual terms (p.250), and Pearl’s (1995, p.670)
account of causal diagrams is explicitly stated in terms of interventions. I separate them here (in §
3.2.1-2) since it is easier to discuss their models separately.
3Of course, this is not the only interpretation, but it is a plausible one. Hume might indeed be
re-read today by replacing ’where’ with ‘where and when’, or he may simply have had in mind
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something similar to ‘just in case’ or ‘such that’. The point is that reading ’where’ as specifying a
location does not require any re-reading at all.
4Which are Kripke-models, provided a relation capturing comparative similarity (Garson 2000),
discussed in (§ 3.2.1)
5There are of course other sorts of underdetermination, such as those arising between competing
theories with distinct non-empirical commitments, that are not addressed by moving to a local
account of causation.
6Moreover, the making of observations requires instrumentation, the causal structure of which
must be assumed not to vary between locations since, as Whitehead (1929) notes, there can be no
“infinite regress of instrumentation”.
7Of course, if we are in a position to empirically distinguish V and U then there must at least
be some observable difference de se, such as that they are observable from different perspectives or
by different observers, but—barring certain causation-observer interdependencies—these will not
prevent us from having precisely identical observations about V and U de re.
8They do not, however, require that we sacrifice our ability to make inferences about unobserved
locations, provided those locations bear certain topological relationships with ones in which we have
previously established causal relationships. This is discussed in § 4, with background provided in
§3.1.
9That is B, the causal nexus, background causal conditions, or “causal machine” in Cartwright’s
(2004) sense.
10Other explanations could be de se, relying on the fallibility of the investigator.
11Woodward’s (2005) manipulability or interventionist theory of causation—which has both reg-
ularity and counterfactual aspects—is perhaps particularly well-suited to modifications required
by a local account of causation. For example, on that account, “generalization can be invariant
within a domain even though it has exceptions outside that domain or holds only within a limited
spatiotemporal region” (p.240).
12See Seebach et al. (1970) for history and examples.
13Only the essentials of sheaf theory are required. These are explained in sufficient detail in § 3.1.
14See Abramsky and Sadrzadeh (2014) for a sheaf-theoretic approach to semantics in natural
language.
15Though this should not be taken as a preference for or endorsement of any of the axioms of the
basic system appearing in Simons (2006).
16Let us say that providing a truth-value distribution or its transpose is “doing local logic”, and
that evaluating truth-value functions at τ is just “doing logic locally”. An analogous distinction,
between “doing local science” and “doing science locally”, appears later (§ 3.2).
17Though, the analysis of systems that can be formed with these resources is not the aim of the
present connection
18The interested reader may compare Goldblatt (1986), Tennison (1975); Lovering (2010); and
Introduction to Schemes, by G Ellingsrud and J. C. Ottem
19Provided we could augment our account of conditional probabilities between events with
nominals, or event names that are true always and only in given nations or months (e.g. ‘Eng-
land’, ‘Norway’, and ‘January’), this point can be succinctly rephrased. The conditional probability,
Pr(Frost | January & England) does not in general determine Pr(Frost | January & Norway).
20The answer to this question is of course underdetermined and may at times require only such
non-iconoclastic maxims as “be circumspect” or “be attentive to local details.” The problem with
this deflation is that such maxims themselves require some notion of locality to be part of rigorous
science, e.g. we should like to know how far one must look around one’s location of experiment
before one has been satisfactorily circumspect.
21Feminist philosophers of science, attentive to the local social conditions of scientific knowledge
production generally, are perhaps the vanguard of a philosophy of local science as a local epistemology
(Longino and Lennon 1997).
22As well as complementing the local counterfactual analysis of causation, the causal graphs ap-
proach helps achieve one of the desiderata—highlighted especially in spatial epidemiology (Jacques
2000)—of local models: a move from models of (probabilistic) data to models of process.
23Ideally, these models would be inferred from empirically derived conditional probability dis-
tributions. Also note: the notation in Pearl (2009) has been modified for consistency here.
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24This is not to say that we should always require our causal models to be sheaves—presheaves
that are not sheaves can still serve a valuable role when full sheaf structure is unavailable, as may
obtain in the case of certain quantum phenomena (Abramsky and Brandenberger 2011).
25Similarly, if F is not a sheaf, the aim of obtaining a global model of causation implies that we
should model causation by its sheafification F ].
26Separated presheaves may have a place in causal modelling, but they are insufficient to deal
with problems of underdetermination.
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[Cartwright, N. (2004).] Causation: One word, many things. Philosophy of Science, 71(5), 805-819.
[Carroll, J. W., (2016).] ”Laws of Nature”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta
(ed.)
[Cavalcanti, E. G.] (2018). Classical causal models for Bell and Kochen-Specker inequality viola-
tions require fine-tuning. Physical Review X, 8(2), 021018.
[Coecke, B., & Lal, R. (2013).] Causal categories: relativistically interacting processes. Foundations
of Physics, 43(4), 458-501.
[Collins, J. D., John Collins, D., Hall, E. J., Paul, L. A., & Hall, N. (Eds.). (2004).] Causation and
counterfactuals. MIT Press.
[Delamater, P. L., Street, E. J., Leslie, T. F., Yang, Y. T., & Jacobsen, K. H. (2019).] Complexity of the
basic reproduction number (R0). Emerging infectious diseases, 25(1), 1.
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